Abstract-We design new secure on-off transmission schemes in wiretap channels with outdated channel state information (CSI). In our design, we consider not only the outdated CSI from the legitimate receiver but two distinct scenarios as well, depending on whether the outdated CSI from the eavesdropper is known at the transmitter. Under this consideration, our schemes exploit useful knowledge contained in the available outdated CSI, and based on this, the transmitter decides on whether to transmit or not. We derive new closed-form expressions for the transmission probability, the connection outage probability, the secrecy outage probability, and the reliable and secure transmission probability to characterize the achievable performance. Based on these results, we present the optimal solutions that maximize the secrecy throughput under dual connection and secrecy outage constraints. Our analytical and numerical results offer detailed insights into the design of the wiretap coding parameters and the imposed outage constraints. We further show that allowing more freedom on the codeword transmission rate enables a larger feasible region of the dual outage constraints by exploiting the tradeoff between reliability and security.
required security level with cryptographic methods alone [2] . In contrast to cryptographic protocols, physical-layer security exploits the statistics of the channel at the physical layer to protect wireless transmission against eavesdropping [3] , [4] . Therefore, it has been widely recognized as a complement to cryptographic protocols for security enhancement and, thus, has attracted enormous research efforts recently.
A. Background
The information-theoretic foundation of physical-layer security was laid down by Shannon's definition of perfect secrecy in [5] . Based on the work in [5] , Wyner [6] introduced the wiretap channel model as a basic framework for physical-layer security. The results in [6] were subsequently generalized to the broadcast channel and the Gaussian channel in [7] and [8] , respectively. These early studies revealed that if the eavesdropper's observation is a degraded version of the legitimate user's observation, it is possible to provide information-theoretically secure communication between the legitimate users while keeping the eavesdropper completely ignorant of secure messages.
A key assumption underpinning the information-theoretic contributions in [6] - [8] is that perfect channel state information (CSI) from both the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper is available at the transmitter. However, this assumption may not be realistic since the uncertainty in CSI is a common factor that affects the performance of practical communication systems. In particular, if the eavesdropper is a passive user, knowing the CSI from the eavesdropper is almost impossible. Moreover, perfect knowledge of the legitimate user's channel may not be easy to obtain at the transmitter in practice, due to the limitations incurred by signal processing techniques, such as channel estimation errors, finite-rate feedback links, and outdated CSI (or delayed CSI).
Against this background, a growing body of research efforts has recently been devoted to examining the impact of imperfect CSI on physical-layer security. Considering the practical passive eavesdropping scenario, in [9] - [13] , transmit antenna selection schemes are proposed to enhance security in wiretap channels. Considering Gaussian-distributed errors produced by imperfect channel estimation at the legitimate receiver, the authors in [14] - [19] designed secure transmission schemes and investigated the achievable performance. It is worth mentioning that He and Zhou in [19] successfully introduced on-off design to develop fixed-rate and variablerate secure transmission schemes in the presence of channel estimation errors. Considering limited feedback constraints, 0018 -9545 © 2015 IEEE. Personal use is permitted, but republication/redistribution requires IEEE permission.
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in [20] - [24] , the secrecy performance in multiantenna systems is characterized, and the optimal power allocation applied in artificial-noise-aided beamforming is studied. Note that Zhang et al. in [24] also adopted an on-off design to develop the optimized artificial-noise-aided transmission scheme in limited feedback channels. In [9] - [24] , although signal processing techniques with passive eavesdropping, imperfect channel estimation, and limited feedback constraints have been developed, the models and methods used in the aforementioned papers cannot be used to address another practical environment where imperfect CSI is caused by the time delay of the feedback link. This motivates us to develop new models and methods for physical-layer security with outdated CSI.
B. Motivation
Outdated CSI is a practical contributor to the uncertainty of channel knowledge at communication nodes. In a practical system with feedback delay from the receiver to the transmitter, the CSI obtained at the transmitter may be an outdated version of the actual CSI. As such, the obtained CSI cannot be directly used for secure transmission. Along this line, there are limited studies in the literature [25] , [26] . Specifically, Yang et al. in [25] derived an upper bound on the secrecy rate loss by exploiting the Gauss-Markov fading spectrum to model the feedback delay, whereas Ferdinand et al. in [26] analyzed the effects of outdated CSI on the secrecy outage performance of multiple-input-single-output wiretap channels with transmit antenna selection. Notably, the studies in [25] and [26] merely concentrated on secrecy performance analysis but have not presented detailed transmission design in the presence of outdated CSI.
It is well to be reminded that although the outdated CSI is not equivalent to the actual CSI, the temporal correlation between outdated CSI and actual CSI makes it possible for the transmitter to exploit some knowledge offered by the outdated CSI to perform secure transmission. Therefore, there arises a significant problem to be addressed: "How can we take advantage of this benefit to design secure transmission schemes?" Recall that the on-off design, as an efficient approach that guarantees transmission quality, has been successfully used to develop transmission schemes in the presence of channel estimation errors [19] and limited feedback constraints [24] , respectively. Motivated by this, in this work, we adopt the on-off design to develop secure transmission schemes in the presence of outdated CSI.
C. Contributions
We develop new secure transmission schemes in the presence of outdated CSI by using the on-off design to exploit the useful information in the outdated CSI. These schemes are designed for two distinct scenarios, depending on whether the eavesdropper is a legitimate user served by the transmitter. In Scenario 1, the eavesdropper is an active user (but not the intended receiver), and the outdated CSI from both the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper is available at the transmitter. In Scenario 2, the eavesdropper is not a legitimate user, and only the outdated CSI from the legitimate receiver is available at the transmitter. The on-off design adopted in our developed schemes allows transmission only when the channel qualities known at the transmitter satisfy some predetermined requirements [9] , [24] , [27] , [28] . The rationale behind the on-off design is that transmission should be avoided when the quality of the intended receiver's channel is poor or when the quality of the eavesdropper's channel is strong.
Our primary contributions are summarized as follows.
• We design new on-off transmission schemes in the presence of outdated CSI and then derive new closed-form expressions for the connection outage probability, the secrecy outage probability, and the reliable and secure transmission probability to quantify the achievable performance. Different from the studies in [19] , [24] , and [28] , for the first time, we incorporate the reliable and secure transmission probability into the formulation of the throughput, forming the secrecy throughput. Notably, the secrecy throughput measures the average rate of the message that is successfully decoded at the legitimate receiver while being kept confidential to the eavesdropper.
• We determine new rate selection strategies that exploit the useful information in the outdated CSI. In these strategies, the codeword transmission rate is adaptively designed according to the feedback from the legitimate receiver. The secrecy rate is optimally selected to maximize the secrecy throughput subject to the constraints on the connection outage probability and the secrecy outage probability. We present the optimal design for both Scenario 1 and Scenario 2.
• We reach an important conclusion that allowing more freedom on the codeword transmission rate enables the enhancement of the reliability level by exploiting the tradeoff between reliability and security, since the codeword transmission rate without optimization leads to poor reliability performance. We further show that this tradeoff provides us with a profound extension in the feasible region of the reliability constraint.
D. Organization
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section II details the outdated CSI model, the on-off transmission schemes, and the wiretap code design in wiretap channels. In Section III, we derive the exact expressions for the performance metrics and offer numerical results to investigate the secrecy performance. In Section IV, the optimized secrecy rates for each scenario are presented, and the illustrative numerical results are provided. Some discussions and concluding remarks are provided in Sections V and VI, respectively.
II. SECURE TRANSMISSION IN THE PRESENCE OF OUTDATED CHANNEL STATE INFORMATION
We consider a wiretap channel where the message transmitted from a source Alice to a destination Bob is intercepted by an eavesdropper Eve. We assume that Alice, Bob, and Eve are each equipped with a single antenna. Throughout this paper, we refer to the Alice-Bob channel as the main channel and to the Alice-Eve channel as the eavesdropper's channel. We assume that both channels are subject to Rayleigh fading. We also assume independent but nonidentical distributions between the main channel and the eavesdropper's channel such that they have different average signal-to-noise ratios (SNRs).
Prior We clarify that in both scenarios, Eve is a regular user served by Alice, and thus, Eve's distance from Alice and the path-loss exponent are known. That is, Alice always knows the average received SNR at Eve, i.e.,γ e . Based on the feedback information, Alice calculates the instantaneous channel capacity of the main channel during pilot transmission as C b = log 2 (1 + γ b ). Moreover, in Scenario 1, Alice calculates the instantaneous channel capacity of the eavesdropper's channel capacity as C e = log 2 (1 + γ e ), whereas in Scenario 2, Alice calculates the average channel capacity of the eavesdropper's channel capacity asC e = log 2 (1 +γ e ). Then, Alice adaptively designs the wiretap codes based on C b and C e in Scenario 1 and based on C b andC e in Scenario 2.
A. Outdated CSI
In this paper, we concentrate on the practical wiretap channel where the CSI obtained at Alice is outdated. In practice, the process of acquiring CSI at the transmitter may take a significant time duration for pilot transmission, channel estimation, and CSI feedback. This results in the fact that the channel coefficients during data transmission are not h b and h e . As such, the CSI obtained at Alice is an imprecise version of the actual CSI, which causes the uncertainty in channel quality.
We first describe the uncertainty in the channel knowledge obtained at Alice in the wiretap channel. We defineh b andh e as the τ d time-delayed versions of h b and h e , respectively. Using a Gauss-Markov process [32] , we formulateh b andh e as 
, from which we find that ρ b and ρ e monotonically degrade to zero as τ d increases. Since Jakes' model is widely adopted in the existing studies on mobile radios [32] , in this work, we use this model to perform the simulations in Sections III-C, IV-C, and V. Therefore, the received signals at Bob and Eve during data transmission are given by 
e , respectively. Of course,γ b andγ e cannot be obtained at Alice.
B. On-Off Schemes and Performance Metrics
We adopt Wyner's encoding strategy [6] for secure transmission in the presence of outdated CSI. Before each transmission block, Alice needs to choose two rate parameters for wiretap code design, i.e., the codeword transmission rate, i.e., R b , and the secrecy rate, i.e., R s . The rate redundancy, i.e., R b − R s , provides secrecy against eavesdropping. We clarify that R b and R s hold constant over the duration of a block. In this paper, we use on-off schemes for Scenario 1 and Scenario 2, as done in [19] , [28] , which are detailed as follows.
• On-off scheme for Scenario 1: Based on the feedback from Bob and Eve, Alice obtains the channel capacity of the main channel C b and the channel capacity of the eavesdropper's channel C e . As such, Alice uses C b and C e to design wiretap codes and performs data transmission only when C b − C e > R s .
• On-off scheme for Scenario 2: Based on the feedback from Bob, Alice only obtains C b . With statistic knowledge of the eavesdropper's channel, Alice uses C b andC e to design wiretap codes and performs data transmission only
It is worthwhile to note that perfect connection and perfect secrecy between Alice and Bob cannot be guaranteed in the presence of outdated CSI for both cases. This is due to the uncertainty in channel knowledge, i.e., Alice has no knowledge of the actual main channel capacity given byC b = log 2 (1 + γ b ) and the actual eavesdropper's channel capacity given bỹ C e = log 2 (1 +γ e ). As such, the connection outage occurs whenC b < R b , in which Bob is unable to decode the received codewords correctly. Mathematically, the connection outage probability, i.e., p co , is defined as [19, eq. (16) ]
Moreover, the secrecy outage occurs when
Mathematically, the secrecy outage probability, i.e., p so , is defined as [19, eq . (15)]
Note that both outage probabilities are conditioned upon a message being transmitted. These outage probabilities are of practical importance since the reliability level and the security level can be measured using these probabilities when the outdated CSI is present. However, from (5) and (6), we find that the connection outage event and the secrecy outage event are definitely not independent from each other but related with R b . To evaluate the combination of reliability and security, we resort to the successful (reliable and secure) transmission probability, i.e., p rst , which is defined as
Notably, (7) is a novel formulation to characterize the reliability and security levels of transmission.
C. Rate Selection Strategy
To exploit the useful knowledge in the outdated CSI, the strategy for the choice of R b and R s is explained as follows: R b is adaptively designed according to the feedback from the legitimate receiver, whereas R s is optimally chosen and keeps constant over the transmission block. In other words, this is an adaptive-codeword-transmission-rate but fixed-secrecy-rate strategy. Since C b is the only knowledge obtained from Bob, it is convenient and natural for Alice to set R b = C b to guarantee maximum rate redundancy against eavesdropping. This leads to the fact that R s is the only controllable parameter in the wiretap code design. As such, R s is optimally chosen before data transmission and then kept constant during data transmission.
The aim of our design is to achieve the optimal secrecy throughput under the constraints of two outage probabilities. Here, the secrecy throughput, i.e., η, is defined as
where p tx denotes the transmission probability, and p rst is given by (7) . We highlight that the secrecy throughput in (8) is different from the throughput in [19] , which is defined as
In (8), we introduce p rst into the formulation of the secrecy throughput. We clarify that the incorporation of p rst is reasonable and necessary for the assessment and improvement of reliability and security. Specifically, p rst jointly quantizes the reliability level and the security level of the secrecy throughput. Using (8), our design aim is formulated as
where denotes the reliability constraint, and δ denotes the security constraint. Note that solving the optimized R s in (9) can help us not only obtain good secrecy throughput performance but keep the reliability and security levels under control as well.
III. SECRECY PERFORMANCE WITH ON-OFF TRANSMISSION SCHEMES
Here, we analyze the secrecy performance for the two scenarios presented in Section II-B by exploiting the on-off transmission schemes. Specifically, we derive the closed-form expressions for the connection outage probability, the secrecy outage probability, and the reliable and secure transmission probability defined in Section II-B. We then present the numerical results to examine the performance of the on-off transmission schemes with outdated CSI.
A. Performance Analysis for Scenario 1
Here, we consider Scenario 1 and derive new expressions for the connection outage probability, the secrecy outage probability, and the reliable and secure transmission probability. We then present the feasibility of the reliability constraint and the security constraint.
, and p rst 1 (R s ): In Scenario 1, Alice sets R b = C b and performs data transmission only when C b − C e ≥ R s . The transmission probability in Scenario 1 is derived as
We note that (10) can be obtained by using the probability density functions (pdfs) of γ b and γ e . In this paper, we assume that both the main channel and the eavesdropper's channel are subject to Rayleigh fading, such that the pdf of The connection outage occurs whenC b < C b . As such, the connection outage probability in Scenario 1 is given by
Based on the cumulative distribution function (cdf) of a noncentral chi-square-distributed variable, we derive p co 1 (R s ) as
where
The proof is given in Appendix A. The secrecy outage occurs when C b − R s <C e . As such, the secrecy outage probability in Scenario 1 is given by
We derive p so 1 (R s ) as
where 1 is
2 is The successful transmission occurs when bothC b ≥ C b and C b −R s ≥C e are simultaneously satisfied. As such, the reliable and secure transmission probability in Scenario 1 is given by
where 3 is
4 is
and 5 = 6 − 7 , where 6 and 7 are given, respectively, in (21) and (22) , shown at the bottom of the next page. The proof is given in Appendix C.
Remark 1:
We clarify that the connection outage probability is merely affected by ρ b , as indicated by (12) , and the secrecy outage probability is merely affected by ρ e , as indicated by (14) . This reveals that in Scenario 1, the reliability level depends on the outdated CSI of the main channel, whereas the security level depends on the outdated CSI of the eavesdropper's channel.
2) Feasibility of Constraints: We now investigate the feasibility of the reliability constraint and the security constraint. Using the mathematical software package to take the first derivative of p co 1 (R s ) in (12), we find that p co 1 (R s ) is an increasing function of R s . When R s → 0, p co 1 (R s ) achieves its lower bound, i.e., p co 1 ,LB . We obtain p co 1 ,LB as
As such, the feasible range of the reliability constraint in Scenario 1 is given by
We then take the first derivative of p so 1 (R s ) in (14) and find that p so 1 (R s ) is also an increasing function of R s . When R s → 0, p so 1 (R s ) achieves its lower bound, i.e., p so 1 ,LB . We obtain p so 1 ,LB as
Accordingly, we obtain the feasible range of the security constraint in Scenario 1 as
We highlight that in Scenario 1, the reliability constraint and the security constraint are feasible only when (24) and (26) are satisfied.
B. Performance Analysis for Scenario 2
Here, we concentrate on Scenario 2. New closed-form expressions are derived for the transmission probability, the connection outage probability, the secrecy outage probability, and the reliable and secure transmission probability; based on this, we evaluate the feasibility of the reliability and security constraints.
In Scenario 2, Alice has no knowledge of C e . As such, Alice sets R b = C b and performs secure transmission only when C b −C e ≥ R s . The transmission probability in Scenario 2 is derived as
The connection outage probability in Scenario 2 is given by
Applying the cdf of a noncentral chi-square-distributed variable, p co 2 (R s ) is derived as
The secrecy outage probability in Scenario 2 is given by
Using the statistics of γ b andγ e , we derive p so 2 (R s ) as
The reliable and secure transmission probability in Scenario 2 is given by
where 8 is
and 9 is
Remark 2: Based on (29) and (31), we find that the connection outage probability is only affected by ρ b but the secrecy outage probability is influenced by neither ρ b nor ρ e . This reveals that in Scenario 2, the outdated CSI only influences the reliability level.
2) Feasibility of Constraints: We then examine the feasibility of the reliability constraint and the security constraint. Using the mathematical software package to take the first-order derivative of p co 2 (R s ) in (29), we find that p co 2 (R s ) is an increasing function of R s . When R s → 0, p co 2 (R s ) achieves its lower bound, i.e., p co 2 ,LB , which is derived as
Therefore, the feasible range of the reliability constraint in Scenario 2 is given by
Next, by observing (31), we see that p so 2 (R s ) is also an increasing function of R s . When R s → 0, p so 2 (R s ) achieves its lower bound, i.e., p so 2 ,LB , which is given by
Thus, the feasible range of the security constraint in Scenario 2 is obtained as
It is worthwhile to note that in Scenario 2, the reliability constraint and the security constraint are feasible only when (37) and (39) are satisfied.
C. Numerical Results
We present numerical results in this section to examine the performance of the on-off transmission schemes. We clarify that the infinitive summations in our derived closed-form expressions can be perfectly approximated with finite summations (usually, the first ten terms in the summations give an accurate approximation). Unless specified otherwise, the simulation settings are as follows: The average received SNR at Bob is assumed to be P b /σ 2 b = 10 dB, whereas the average received SNR at Eve is assumed to be P e /σ 2 e = 0 dB. In each simulation trial, the main channel coefficient and the eavesdropper's channel coefficient are randomly generated using an independent and identically distributed complex Gaussian distribution with zero mean and unit variance. The temporal correlation parameters of the two channel coefficients are assumed to follow Clarke's model and are characterized by ρ b = J 0 (2πf b τ d ) and ρ e = J 0 (2πf e τ d ), respectively. All the results to be shown are averaged over 10 000 channel trials. It is evident in Figs. 1-3 that the Monte Carlo simulation points, marked by " * ," precisely match the analytical curves, which demonstrates the accuracy of our analysis. Fig. 1 plots the connection outage probability versus R s for two scenarios with different values of ρ b . In this figure, p co 1 (R s ) and p co 2 (R s ) are generated from (12) and (29), respectively. We first observe that p co 1 (R s ) and p co 2 (R s ) increase with R s . This is due to the fact that an increasing R s requires a higher C b to satisfy the transmission condition. Notably, a higher C b leads to a higher probability thatC b is lower than C b , due to the characteristics of the Gauss-Markov process. Second, we observe that p co 1 (R s ) and p co 2 (R s ) increase when ρ b decreases. This observation is not surprising since the uncertainty in the main channel quality increases as ρ b decreases, which results in poorer reliability. Third, we observe that p co 2 (R s ) is higher than p co 1 (R s ) for the same ρ b . This is due to the fact that the transmission condition in Scenario 2, i.e., C b ≥C e +R s , is stricter than that in Scenario 1, i.e., C b ≥ C e +R s . Thus, a higher C b is required in Scenario 2, which results in worse reliability. Fourth, we observe that both p co 1 (R s ) and p co 2 (R s ) are always greater than 0.5, which implies that the reliability constraint should be loose in the on-off transmission schemes. Fig. 2 plots the secrecy outage probability versus R s for two scenarios with different values of ρ e . In this figure, p so 1 (R s ) and p so 2 (R s ) are generated from (14) and (31), respectively. First, we observe that p so 1 (R s ) and p so 2 (R s ) increase as R s increases. This is due to the fact that the rate redundancy, i.e., C b − R s , decreases with R s and a lower rate redundancy leads to a higher probability thatC e is higher than the rate redundancy. We then find that p so 2 (R s ) is not influenced by the value of ρ e and that different behaviors of p so 1 (R s ) are observed, depending on the value of ρ e , as indicated by (31) . When ρ e is not sufficiently high (e.g., ρ e ≤ 0.5), p so 1 (R s ) is always higher than p so 2 (R s ); however, when ρ e is sufficiently high (e.g., ρ e > 0.9), the opposite happens. From a design perspective, this observation implies that C e should be used for transmission design only when ρ e is high; otherwise, directly usingC e is a better choice for security enhancement. Moreover, we find that p so 1 (R s ) and p so 2 (R s ) are smaller than 0.1 for low R s , which implies that the security constraint can be sufficiently strict in the on-off transmission schemes. Fig. 3 plots the reliable and secrecy transmission probability versus R s for two scenarios with different values of ρ b and ρ e . In this figure, p rst 1 (R s ) and p rst 2 (R s ) are generated from (18) and (33), respectively. We first observe that p rst 1 (R s ) and p rst 2 (R s ) decrease as R s increases. This is due to the fact that increasing R s strengthens the transmission condition (requiring higher C b ), which leads to a lower probability thatC b is higher than C b while the rate redundancy is higher thanC e . We also observe that p rst 1 (R s ) and p rst 2 (R s ) decrease when ρ b decreases. Moreover, for a fixed ρ b in Scenario 1, p rst 1 (R s ) also decreases when ρ e decreases. This is because the uncertainty in the main and eavesdropper's channel quality increases as ρ b and ρ e decrease, which results in poorer reliability and security levels. Furthermore, we observe that for a fixed ρ b , when ρ e is high (e.g., ρ e = 0.8), p rst 1 (R s ) is higher than p rst 2 (R s ); however, when ρ e is low (e.g., ρ e = 0.5), p rst 1 (R s ) is lower than p rst 2 (R s ). This observation demonstrates that in terms of the reliable and secrecy transmission probability, a sufficiently high ρ e is required to guarantee that Scenario 1 performs better than Scenario 2. Fig. 4 plots the reliable and secure transmission probability versus τ d for Scenario 1 with different values of R s . The correlation coefficients are generated by Clark's fading model with v b = v e = 30 km/h and f c = 900 MHz. We first observe that p rst 1 (R s ) is not a monotonically decreasing function of τ d . In particular, we find that p rst 1 (R s ) rapidly decreases before τ d increases to 10 ms. However, when τ d is sufficiently large, i.e., τ d > 10 ms, p rst 1 (R s ) starts to fluctuate around a certain value and does not decrease further. This observation is not surprising since the absolute values of ρ b and ρ e , which are generated by Clark's fading model, fluctuate in the large-delay regime. Moreover, we observe that for a fixed τ d , p rst 1 (R s ) decreases as R s increases, which has been explained in the descriptions of Fig. 3 . Similarly, we conclude that p rst 2 (R s ) versus τ d for Scenario 2 has a similar conclusion. The detailed illustrations for Scenario 2 are omitted in this section to avoid redundancy. Fig. 5 plots the feasible security constraint versus the feasible reliability constraint for both scenarios. In this figure, p co 1 ,LB , p so 1 ,LB , p co 2 ,LB , and p so 2 ,LB are generated from (23), (25) , (36), and (38), respectively. For each scenario with specific ρ b and ρ e (only ρ e in Scenario 2), the feasible region of and δ lies in the region above the corresponding curve. First, we observe that in both Scenario 1 and Scenario 2, increasing ρ b leads to the extension of the feasible region. Second, we observe that the feasible region in Scenario 2 is not influenced by ρ e , whereas in Scenario 1, we observe the extension in the feasible region when ρ e increases. Third, we observe that for the same ρ b , Scenario 1 enables a higher reliability level than Scenario 2. However, in terms of the security level, whether Scenario 1 performs better or not depends on the value of ρ e . In particular, Scenario 1 enables a higher security level when ρ e is high (e.g., ρ e = 0.8), whereas Scenario 2 enables a higher security level when ρ e is low (e.g., ρ e = 0.5). Fourth, we observe that the feasible regions are strictly restricted at the right side of = 0.5, which implies that this transmission design ignores the system reliability and can be only applied for the systems where reliability is not seen as important.
IV. SECURE TRANSMISSION DESIGN
Here, we first investigate the optimal solutions for R s meeting (9) for each scenario; based on this, we then present numerical results to investigate the impact of the dual outage constraints on the secrecy throughput in both scenarios.
A. Optimized R s for Scenario 1
In Scenario 1, the secrecy throughput is given by
Mathematically, we express S 1 as
Using the mathematical software package to take the firstorder derivative of η 1 (R s ) with respect to R s , we find that ∂η 1 (R s )/∂R s is first positive and then negative, which confirms that without dual outage constraints, there is a unique solution to S 1 , which achieves the maximum η 1 (R s ). Based on the feasibility for the dual outage constraints presented in (24) and (26), we express S 2 and S 3 as
respectively. As mentioned in Section III-A, both p co 1 (R s ) and p so 1 (R s ) are monotonically increasing functions of R s , which guarantees that both (42) and (43) each have a unique solution. Although the closed-form solutions for S 1 , S 2 , and S 3 are mathematically intractable, we are able to obtain them using a numerical method, e.g., bisection method. Based on the given results, we present the optimal R s that meets (9) in Scenario 1 in the following proposition.
Proposition 1: The optimal R s that maximizes the secrecy throughput in Scenario 1, subject to the connection and secrecy constraints, is given by
where S 1 , S 2 , and S 3 are given by (41)-(43), respectively. Proof: By solving (41)- (43), the values of S 1 , S 2 , and S 3 can be obtained, as shown in Fig. 6 . For a given and δ, the optimized R s must lie within not only the feasible region determined by S 2 but the feasible region determined by S 3 as well. As such, the feasible region of R s is S = [0, min{S 2 , S 3 }].
Based on S, we obtain the optimal R s maximizing the secrecy throughput with dual outage constraints in the following two cases.
• If S 1 < min{S 2 , S 3 }, as shown in Fig. 6(a) , S 1 lies within the feasible region S. That is, the maximum η 1 (R s ) is still available in the feasible region S, and S 1 is the unique solution. Hence, we have R * s 1 = S 1 . We highlight that in this case, the outage constraints impose no effects on the optimal solution.
• If S 1 ≥ min{S 2 , S 3 }, as shown in Fig. 6(b) , S 1 lies beyond the feasible region S and cannot be treated as the solution. Moreover, we find that η 1 (R s ) is a monotonically increasing function of R s in the feasible region S.
As such, we take R * s 1 = min{S 2 , S 3 } to guarantee that the highest secrecy throughput can be obtained.
To sum up the conclusions in the aforementioned two cases, the optimal R s maximizing the secrecy throughput with dual outage constraints in (44) can be obtained.
B. Optimized R s for Scenario 2
In Scenario 2, the secrecy throughput is given by
Mathematically, we express T 1 as
We first use the mathematical software package to take the firstorder derivative of η 2 (R s ) with respect to R s and find that ∂η 2 (R s )/∂R s is first positive and then negative. This indicates that there is a unique value of R s maximizing η 2 (R s ) subject to no outage constraints. Hence, we conclude that (46) has a unique solution. Based on the feasibility for the dual outage constraints presented in (37) and (39), we express T 2 and T 3 as
respectively. As mentioned in Section III-B, p co 2 (R s ) is a monotonically increasing function of R s , which implies that (47) has a unique solution.
Despite the fact that the closed-form solutions for T 1 and T 2 are mathematically intractable, we are still able to obtain them using a numerical method, e.g., bisection method. Based on the given results, we present the optimal R s that meets (9) in Scenario 2 in the following proposition.
Proposition 2: The optimal R s that maximizes the secrecy throughput in Scenario 2, subject to two constraints, is given by
where T 1 , T 2 , and T 3 are given by (46) and (47), respectively. Proof: The proof is similar with the proof for Proposition 1. Here, we omit the detailed proving process for brevity.
C. Numerical Results
Here, we present numerical results to investigate the impact of the dual outage constraints on the secrecy throughput in each scenario. Since our analytical results have been verified using Monte Carlo simulations in Section III-C, the Monte Carlo simulation points are omitted in this section to avoid unnecessary clutter. Fig. 7 plots the secrecy throughput versus R s for the two scenarios with different values of ρ b and ρ e . In this figure, we generate η 1 (R s ) and η 2 (R s ) from (40) and (45), respectively. Moreover, we do not consider the reliability and security constraints such that = δ = 1. Moreover, we do not consider the reliability and security constraints such that = δ = 1. We first observe that the secrecy throughput first increases and then decreases as R s increases, indicating that an optimal R s indeed exists such that the secrecy throughput is maximized. Thus, we clarify that (41) and (46) each have a unique solution. We also observe that the secrecy throughput decreases when ρ b or ρ e decreases. Furthermore, we observe that for the same ρ b , the secrecy throughput in Scenario 1 is higher than that in Scenario 2, even if ρ e is fairly low (e.g., ρ e = 0.3). This is due to the fact that there is a higher probability to perform transmission in Scenario 1 than that in Scenario 2. Thus, Scenario 1 offers a better secrecy throughput than Scenario 2 without the outage constraints.
Figs. 8 and 9 plot the secrecy throughput for two scenarios versus the reliability constraint and the security constraint, respectively. We first observe that the secrecy throughput is a monotonically nondecreasing function of either constraint. We then see that a positive secrecy throughput is achieved only when the two constraints are within the feasible ranges. For example, in Fig. 8 , a positive secrecy throughput is achieved when 0.534 < ≤ 1 in Scenario 1 and when 0.541 < ≤ 1 in Scenario 2. Moreover, in Fig. 9 , a positive secrecy throughput is achieved when 0.027 < δ ≤ 1 in Scenario 1 and when 0.034 < δ ≤ 1 in Scenario 2. Notably, we find that in the specific case with ρ b = ρ e = 0.8, Scenario 1 has a stricter security constraint and a stricter reliability constraint than Scenario 2. Furthermore, we observe that a constraint threshold exists such that the secrecy throughput keeps constant after the constraint exceeds the threshold. For example, it is shown in Figs. 8 and 9 that the maximum secrecy throughput in Scenario 1 is achieved when ≥ 0.614 and δ ≥ 0.081 and the maximum secrecy throughput in Scenario 2 is achieved when ≥ 0.624 and δ ≥ 0.086. This is due to the fact that the optimal R s can always be used to perform data transmission with the same secrecy throughput when the constraints are higher than the thresholds.
V. DISCUSSIONS
As seen in Section IV, R s is the only controllable parameter for transmission design. Our solutions of the optimal R s allow us to maximize the secrecy throughput subject to two constraints. We also note that the designed transmission schemes forego the reliability level, as shown in Fig. 5 . This is due to the fact that in the presence of the outdated CSI, the main channel quality known at Alice tends to be higher than the instantaneous channel capacity for secure transmission. As such, this transmission design may not be suitable for the systems where the reliability is in high demand. Motivated by this, in this section, we present some discussions about the possible transmission design to improve the reliability level. Based on the aforementioned reasons, we believe that the use of R b = C b makes the quality of the main channel overestimated. Thus, it is wise for Alice to set R b as By applying (50) into the system model in Section II-B and using the similar approaches in Section III, we can derive the closed-form expressions of p co 1 (u, R s ), p so 1 (u, R s ), p co 2 (u, R s ), and p so 2 (u, R s ). Thus, the lower bounds on these outage probabilities for a given u, such as p co 1 ,LB (u), p so 1 ,LB (u), p co 2 ,LB (u), and p so 2 ,LB (u), can be obtained by setting R s = 0. Here, the detailed derivations are omitted for brevity. We then find that the choice of R b , which is indicated by (50), enables a tradeoff between the feasible reliability constraint and the feasible security constraint. For example, a lower R b leads to a lower connection outage probability but a higher secrecy outage probability. This implies that if we set a more loose reliability constraint, the security constraint becomes stricter.
To illustrate this tradeoff between the feasible reliability constraint and the feasible security constraint, Fig. 10 plots the new feasible region of the dual outage constraints for both scenarios. In this figure, the curves are generated by using the values of p co 1 ,LB (u), p so 1 ,LB (u), p co 2 ,LB (u), and p so 2 ,LB (u) at all values of u. For each scenario with fixed ρ b and ρ e , the feasible region of and δ lies in the region above the corresponding curve. We first observe that when u increases, the lower bound on the connection outage probability increases, but the lower bound on the secrecy outage probability decreases. For example, in Scenario 2, when u increases from 0 to 1, the lower bound on the connection outage probability increases from 0 to p co 2 ,LB , as indicated by (36), whereas the lower bound on the secrecy outage probability decreases from 1 to p so 2 ,LB , as indicated by (38). This observation is not surprising since allowing more freedom on R b enables a tradeoff between reliability and security. Notably, this tradeoff leads to a profound extension in the feasible region, compared with Fig. 5 . We also observe the extension of the feasible region when ρ b or ρ e increases, which is due to the fact that the uncertainty in the main channel and the eavesdropper's channel decreases when ρ b and ρ e increase, respectively. This indicates that the more knowledge about the channel quality is known at Alice, the better reliability and security levels that can be achieved.
VI. CONCLUSION
In the presence of outdated CSI, we have adopted the on-off scheme to help perform secure transmission, under which we conducted the secrecy performance in a wiretap channel and then presented the design of wiretap coding parameters. In particular, we considered two scenarios with different assumptions on the CSI from the eavesdropper. For each scenario, we derived the transmission probability, the connection outage probability, the secrecy outage probability, and the reliable and secure transmission probability. Based on these results, we determined the optimal secrecy rates that maximize the secrecy throughput under dual connection and secrecy outage constraints. Moreover, we found that a larger feasible region of the dual outage constraints can be obtained by optimizing the codeword transmission rate.
Based on (11), we formulate p co 1 (R s ) as
We first re-express the numerator of p co 1 (R s ) as (53) Substituting (53) into Ξ 1 , we derive Ξ 1 as
where Q 1 (a, b) represents Marcum's Q-function [34] . We then use the series representation of Marcum's Q-function in terms of Bessel functions, which is given by to obtain the series representation of Ξ 1 , which yields
Substituting (57) into Ξ 2 , we derive Ξ 2 as Substituting (58) into (52) and solving the resultant integrals, the numerator of p co 1 (R s ) is obtained. We also note that the denominator of p co 1 (R s ) is given by (10) . Therefore, we obtain p co 1 (R s ) in (12 
Finally, we substitute (65) into (60) and solve the resultant integrals to obtain the numerator of p so 1 (R s ). Hence, p so 1 (R s ) in (14) With the help of Ξ 1 in Appendix A and Φ 2 in Appendix B, we obtain the series representations of Δ 1 and Δ 2 as
where Ξ 1 is given by (57), and Φ 2 is given by (65). Finally, substituting (70) and (71) into (67) and solving for the resultant integrals, the numerator of p rst 1 (R s ) is obtained. Using (10), p rst 1 (R s ) in (18) can be obtained.
